Almost all institutions within modern democracies depend on a mix of communication and competition. However, most formal theory and experimental evidence ignores one of these two features. We present a formal theory of communicative competition in which senders vary in their aversion to lying,...

We provide a definition of institutionalism and a schematic account that differentiates between institutional theories (in which institutions are exogenous) and theories of institutions, in which some (but not necessarily all) institutions are endogenous. Our primary argument is that...

A spatial theory of the comparative consequences of unified and divided government clarifies the relationship between institutions, partisanship and gridlock. Under formally specified conditions, executive and legislative institutions are shown to inhibit but not prohibit the convergence of...

We analyze strategic communication and voting when agents do not necessarily have common beliefs and values. The potential for some pairs of participants to have opposed preferences makes truthful revelation difficult to support. Nonetheless, truthful equilibria are shown to exist for some...

While scholars have thoroughly explored the logic of two candidate electoral competition, much less has been accomplished in gaining an understanding of the role of party primaries. This paper presents an incomplete information model of primary and general elections and argues that party...