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The tradeoff between performance and quitting in high power tournaments

Fershtman, Chaim; Genîzî, Ûrî - In: Journal of the European Economic Association 9 (2011) 2, pp. 318-336

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10009247225

On the relative efficiency of performance pay and noncontingent incentives

Genîzî, Ûrî; Rey-Biel, Pedro - In: Journal of the European Economic Association 12 (2014) 1, pp. 62-72

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010391027

The limits of expectations-based reference dependence

Genîzî, Ûrî; Götte, Lorenz; Sprenger, Charles; … - In: Journal of the European Economic Association 15 (2017) 4, pp. 861-876

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10011803989

ON THE RELATIVE EFFICIENCY OF PERFORMANCE PAY AND NONCONTINGENT INCENTIVES

Gneezy, Uri; Rey-Biel, Pedro - In: Journal of the European Economic Association 12 (2014) 1, pp. 62-72

We report evidence from a large field experiment that compares the effectiveness of contingent and noncontingent incentives in eliciting costly effort for a large range of payment levels. The company with which we worked sent 7,250 letters asking customers to complete a survey. Some letters...

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010743377

THE TRADEOFF BETWEEN PERFORMANCE AND QUITTING IN HIGH POWER TOURNAMENTS

Fershtman, Chaim; Gneezy, Uri - In: Journal of the European Economic Association 9 (2011) 2, pp. 318-336

Persistent link: https://ebvufind01.dmz1.zbw.eu/10010626683