We show the nuetrality of coalition formation in the sequential bargaining game a la Stahl-Binmore-Rubinstein with random proposers. To that end, we juxtapose an ex-ante coalition formation stage to their bargaining game. Based on the expected outcomes in the negotiation over how to split a...

We give an example to show that efficiency in the principal-agent organization depends on the public information nature of the wage contracts. When wage contracts are private, the principal may have a moral hazard problem in deviating from some of the contracts, and efficiency need not hold even...

In this paper, we investigated the limit solution of the subgame perfect equilibrium of the sequential bargaining game with a deadline. The solution represents the bargaining outcome when players can exchange offers and counteroffers infinitely often within a limited amount of time. The outcome...

In thsi paper, we examine the consequences of CDM baselines that are influenced by the endogenous choice of output levels on the part of firms participating in CDM projects. When a CDM project reduces per output emissions level, so-called ex-post baseline methodology may well cause output to...