In a framework with two parties, deterministic voter preferences and a type of geographical constraints, we propose a set of simple axioms and show that they jointly characterize the districting rule that maximizes the number of districts one party can win, given the distribution of individual...

Voting rules can be assessed from quite different perspectives: the axiomatic, the pragmatic, in terms of computational or conceptual simplicity, susceptibility to manipulation, and many others aspects. In this paper, we take the machine learning perspective and ask how 'well' a few prominent...

Condorcet domains are sets of preference orders such that the majority relation corresponding to any profile of preferences from the domain is acyclic. The best known examples in economics are the single-peaked, the single-crossing, and the group separable domains. We survey the latest...

We study a voting model with partial information in which the evaluation of social welfare must be based on information about agents' top choices plus qualitative background conditions on preferences. The former is elicited individually, while the latter is not. The social evaluator is modeled...

How can we assess the diversity of a group of decision makers? Identifying decision makers with their preferences, we address this question by applying the multi-attribute approach developed by Nehring and Puppe (2002) to sets of preferences. Specifically, we provide a repertoire of alternative...

What determines reciprocity in employment relations? We conducted a controlled field experiment to measure the extent to which monetary and non-monetary gifts affect workers' performance. We find that nonmonetary gifts have a much stronger impact than monetary gifts of equivalent value. We also...

We consider the problem of how societies should be partitioned into classes if individuals express their views about who should be put with whom in the same class. A non-bossy social aggregator depends only on those cells of the individual partitions the society members classify themselves in....

Judgement aggregation is a model of social choice in which the space of social alternatives is the set of consistent evaluations (views) on a family of logically interconnected propositions, or yes/no-issues. Yet, simply complying with the majority opinion in each issue often yields a logically...

Sequential majority voting over interconnected binary propositions can lead to the overruling of unanimous consensus. We characterize, within the general framework of judgement aggregation, under what circumstances this happens for some sequence of the voting process. It turns out that the class...

In dynamic resource allocation models, the non-existence of voting equilibria is a generic phenomenon due to the multi-dimensionality of the choice space even with agents heterogeneous only in their discount factors. Nevertheless, at each point of time there may exist a "median voter" whose...