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Enforcement-proof contracts with moral hazard in precaution: ensuring ‘permanence’ in carbon sequestration
MacKenzie, Ian A.; Ohndorf, Markus; Palmer, Charles - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2010
potential for opportunistic contract breach. The optimal design of forest carbon contracts to ensure permanence is derived …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745900
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Cost-effective payments for reducing emissions from deforestation under uncertainty
Engel, Stefanie; Palmer, Charles; Taschini, Luca; … - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2012
secure forest carbon sinks over time (the ‘permanence criterion’) while remaining relatively cost-effective. Alternative …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746548