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Felli, Leonardo; Merlo, Antonio - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2003

In this paper we present a citizen-candidate model of representative democracy with endogenous lobbying. We find that lobbying induces policy compromise and always affects equilibrium policy outcomes. In particular, even though the policy preferences of lobbies are relatively extreme, lobbying...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746186

Estimating the peace dividend: the impact of violence on house prices in Northern Ireland

Besley, Timothy; Mueller, Hannes - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2009

This paper exploits data on the pattern of violence across regions and over time to estimate the impact of the peace process in Northern Ireland on house prices. We begin with a linear model that estimates the average treatment effect of a conflictrelated killing on house prices - showing a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746053

Persuading voters

Alonso, Ricardo; Câmara, Odilon - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2014

supermajority (or unanimity) voting rule, in order to induce the controller to supply a more informative signal. …In a symmetric information voting model, an individual (information controller) can influence voters’ choices by …-unanimous voting rule, she exploits voters’ heterogeneity by designing a signal with realizations targeting di↵erent winning …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011126416

Government corruption and legislative procedures: is one chamber better than two?

Testa, Cecilia - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2003

This paper studies the impact of the competition between lobbies and voters on policy outcomes under alternative legislative procedures. Lobbies and citizens have opposing interests in a public policy and offer money and votes, respectively, to legislators to obtain their preferred policy....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928625

Government transfers and political support

Manacorda, Marco; Miguel, Edward; Vigorito, Andrea - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2009

the probabilistic voting model in political economy. Effects persist after the cash transfer program ends. We estimate …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010745876

Does political knowledge increase turnout? Evidence from the 1997 British general election

Larcinese, Valentino - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2005

political knowledge has a sizeable influence on the probability of voting and that mass media play an important role in …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010746429

Testing models of distributive politics using exit polls to measure voter preferences and partisanship

Larcinese, Valentino; Snyder (Jr.), James M.; Testa, Cecilia - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2006

This paper tests various hypotheses about distributive politics by studying the distribution of federal spending across U.S. states over the period 1978-2002. We improve on previous work by using survey data to measure the share of voters in each state that are Democrats, Republicans, and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011071348

Being the New York Times: the political behaviour of a newspaper

Puglisi, Riccardo - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2006

I analyze a dataset of news from the New York Times, from 1946 to 1997. Controlling for the incumbent President's activity across issues, I find that during the presidential campaign the New York Times gives more emphasis to topics that are owned by the Democratic party (civil rights, health...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928712

A swing-state theory of trade protection in the electoral college

Muûls, Mirabelle; Petropoulou, Dimitra - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2008

This paper develops an infinite-horizon, political agency model with a continuum of political districts, in which incumbent politicians can improve their re-election probability by attracting swing voters in key states through strategic trade protection. A unique equilibrium is shown to exist...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010928735

On the theory of ethnic conflict

Caselli, Francesco; Coleman, Wilbur John - London School of Economics (LSE) - 2013

When considering engaging in conflict to secure control of a resource, a group needs to predict the amount of post-conflict leakage due to infiltration by members of losing groups. We use this insight to explain why conflict often takes place along ethnic lines, why some ethnic groups are more...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011126000

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