In this paper we analyze the exploitation of wildlife in a Third World context. In the model there are two agents: an agency managing a habitat area of fixed size and a group of peasants. The agency managing the habitat area has the legal right to exploit the wildlife, while the local people...

Without resorting to the folk theorem or to altruistic preferences, we demonstrate that the problem of overharvesting among individually rational harvesters in a local commons vanishes if the harvesters share, and voluntarily contribute to, some public good. Formulating the model as a two-stage...

Wild animals can represent both value and nuisance. We consider the moose (Alces alces), which due to seasonal migration causes browsing damage in some areas, while creating hunting value in other areas. We first explore a situation when harvesting, following today’s practice in Norway, only...

This paper analyzes coalition formation in a livestock-pasture system where livestock are privately owned and the pasture is a common property. While standard models predict rather low prospects of cooperation, this paper introduces a cost advantage of cooperation based on Saami reindeer herding...

Total Allowable Catch (TAC)-regulating schemes have been introduced in most fisheries. TAC distribution following the Proportional Rule, based on historical catches, implies that harvesters or vessel groups that have captured more in the past and contributed to overfishing are getting larger...