We experimentally investigate a finitely repeated public good game with varying partners. Within each period, participants are pairwise matched and contribute simultaneously. Participants are informed about contributions and each participant evaluates her partner's contribution. At the beginning...

We present a theoretical model of a linear public good game in which heterogeneous players express social approval after observing contributions. The model explains how social approval is expressed and predicts positive contributions if subjects have a preference for social approval. Using a...

Pay What You Want (PWYW) pricing has received considerable attention recently. Empirical studies show that if PWYW pricing is implemented, in a number of cases consumers do not behave selfishly and that some producers are able to use PWYW for increasing turnover and profits respectively. In this...

This paper develops a method to integrate affective reponses into game theoretical models. We illustrate our method in a team production framework. The model analyzes how concave and convex status preferences for esteem solve the problem of team production under complete and incomplete...

A variety of different social contexts have been used when measuring distributional preferences. This could be problematic as different degrees of social interdependence may affect people's distributional preferences, and this contextual variance may inadvertently muddle the measurement process...

We review a large number of empirical studies on Pay-What-You-Want (PWYW) pricing. We distinguish between laboratory experiments, field experiments, survey experiments and case studies. Based on this survey we identify the following two gaps in the recently flourishing literature on PWYW...