This theoretical note examines the usefulness of the Pigouvian tax policy in dealing with negative production externalities and in improving social welfare in a small developing economy. A two-sector, full-employment general equilibrium model with exogenous labour market imperfection is used for...

We develop a three-sector general equilibrium model and attempt to examine the impact of FDI in healthcare sector on the welfare and human capital stock of the economy. The greater the size of the healthcare sector the higher and better would be the medical facilities available to each member of...

This paper shows that developing countries possess an inherent shock-absorbing mechanism that stems from their peculiar institutional characteristics and can lessen the gravity of detrimental welfare consequence of exogenous terms-of-trade disturbances in terms of a two-sector, full-employment...

We investigate government subsidy policies in which a home firm and a foreign firm choose to strategically set prices or quantities in a third market. We show that even though each firm can earn higher profits under Cournot competition than under Bertrand competition regardless of the nature of...

A three-sector, three-factor general equilibrium model is developed for a small open developing economy where an inflow of foreign capital generates externalities in the presence of a non-traded final commodity. There are two types of capital and the efficiency of labour depends positively on...

By introducing the government's preference for tax revenues into unionized mixed duopolies, this paper investigates how the preference can change the government's choice of tax regimes between ad valorem and specific taxes. Main results are as follows. Given that one of the tax regimes is...

The paper purports to examine the rationale in subsidizing healthcare in the developing economies solely from the standpoint of economic growth with the help of a three-sector, full-employment small economy model with exogenous labour market imperfection and a non-traded sector providing...

The paper examines the timing of endogenous wage setting under Bertrand competition in a unionized mixed duopoly. The results are that when the public firm chooses the timing of wage setting: (1) sequential wage setting is the outcome and (2) simultaneous wage setting is the outcome. The first...

This paper investigates Bertrand competition of unionized mixed duopoly when the public firm is less efficient than the private firm, including endogenous imposition of the budget constraint on the public firm. Thus, we show that if the public firm's inefficiency is sufficiently small, no...