In this paper we provide sufficient conditions for the existence stable matchings for three-sided systems.

In this paper we show that in an exchange economy with quasi-linear preferences it is possible to manipulate market equilibrium by destroying and withholding ones initial endowments.

In this paper we provide a sufficient condition for a social welfare relation to be a social decision relation (i.e. an acyclic social welfare relation) when the profile of individual preferences is given.

The first result in this paper says that given any efficient non-monetary allocation there is a balanced vector of transfers so that the resulting allocation is fair. The second result here says that given any efficient non-monetary allocation there is a pricing function defined on consumption...

In this paper we show that if the Pareto relation is acyclic then the set of all Pareto optimal social states coincides with chosen social states of acyclic Paretian social welfare relations. Subsequently we show that given an acyclic Paretian social welfare relations the set of all social...

In this paper we consider choice correspondences which may be empty-valued. We study conditions under which such choice correspondences are rational, transitively rational, partially rational, partially almost transitive rational, partially almost quasi-transitive rational.

In this paper we show that in an exchange economy with quasi-linear preferences it is possible to manipulate market equilibrium by destroying and withholding ones initial endowments.