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Tacit collusion and capacity withholding in repeated uniform price auctions

Dechenaux, Emmanuel; Kovenock, Dan - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2007

-quantity pair, perfect collusion with equal sharing of profit is easier to sustain in the uniform price auction than in the …This article analyzes tacit collusion in infinitely repeated multiunit uniform price auctions in a symmetric … corresponding discriminatory auction. Moreover, capacity withholding may be necessary to sustain this outcome. Even when firms may …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009650691

A theory of antitrust enforcement game

Jellal, Mohamed; Souam, Said - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012

We analyze a situation where an antitrust authority delegates to an audit inspector the mission of gathering the sufficient information to condemn a cartel. The authority has two instruments at her disposal: rewarding the inspector with a proportion of the collected fine or providing him with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011107712

Social structure bureaucracy and corruptionA

Jellal, Mohamed - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

Using the principal-agent- supervisor paradigm, this paper examines the occurrence of collusion in a setting where the … formally prove the occurrence of collusion is more likely when the agent has information about the preferences of the …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011107791

On the Sustainability of Product Market Collusion under Credit Market Imperfection

Marjit, Sugata; Mukherjee, Arijit; Yang, Lei - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

We study the implication of credit constraints for the sustainability of product market collusion in a bank financed … there is no credit rationing moderately higher cost of external finance may affect the degree of collusion, but a … collusion, but may aggravate the finance constraint and eventually lead to collusion. We also discuss the case with credit …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011108211

Sequential lending with dynamic joint liability in micro-finance

Chowdhury, Shyamal; Roy Chowdhury, Prabal; Sengupta, Kunal - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

This paper develops a theory of sequential lending in groups in micro-finance that centers on the notion of dynamic incentives, in particular the simple idea that default incentives should be relatively uniformly distributed across time. In a framework that allows project returns to accrue over...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011108610

The collusion incentive constraint

Larsen, Huric; Fredborg, Jesper - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

The collusion incentive constraint is an important economic measure of cartel stability. It weighs the profits of being …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011109808

Asymmetric Pricing Caused by Collusion

Obradovits, Martin - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

In many markets, empirical evidence suggests that positive production cost shocks are transmitted more quickly and fully to final prices than negative ones. This article explains asymmetric price adjustment caused by firms imperfectly colluding on supra-competitive price levels. While positive...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011110548

Horizontal and Vertical Linkages between Formal and Informal Credit Markets in Backward Agriculture: A Theoretical Analysis

Chaudhuri, Sarbajit; Dwibedi, Jayanta - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

The paper shows that the policy of forging a vertical linkage between the formal and informal credit markets is distinctly superior to the existing credit policy of horizontally substituting the informal sector by the formal one. An inflow of subsidized formal credit to the informal lenders not...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011110560

Keep to sustain or keep to exploit? Why firms keep hard evidence

Agisilaou, Panayiotis - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012

We develop a model wherein collusive firms' decisions to keep or to destroy the hard evidence is endogenous. Unlike previous literature, we assume that the administration of the cartel crucially depends on the existence of the hard evidence. Within this framework, we explore the impact of a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011110619

Incentives and optimal antitrust policy

Jellal, Mohamed; Souam, Said - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

We analyze a model where an antitrust authority delegates to an audit inspector the mission of gathering the sufficient information to condemn a cartel. The authority has two instruments at her disposal: rewarding the inspector with a proportion of the collected fine or providing him with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011111727