This paper examines a dynamic process of n-person coalitional bargaining problems. We study the stochastic evolution of social conventions by embedding a static bargaining setting in a dynamic process; Over time agents revise their coalitions and surplus distributions in the presence of...

In Hart and Kurz (1983), stability and formation of coalition structures has been investigated in a noncooperative framework in which the strategy of each player is the coalition he wishes to join. However, given a strategy profile, the coalition structure formed is not unequivocally determined....

We present a novel algorithm to determine the payoff-space of certain normal-form C1 parametric games, and - more generally - of continuous families of normal-form C1 games. The algorithm has been implemented by using MATLAB, and it has been applied to several examples. The implementation of the...

In a recent paper, Duersch et.al (2012) showed that in a rather broad class of repeated symmetric two-player games, a player who uses the simple "imitate-if-better" heuristic cannot be subject to a money pump. In this paper, we extend the analysis to games with randomly perturbed payoffs and we...

We study an example of infinitely repeated games in which symmetric duopolistic firms produce experience goods. After consuming the products, short-run consumers only observe imperfect public information about product quality. We characterize perfect public equilibrium payoff set E(δ) of firms...

We study an infinitely repeated game where two players with equal discount factors play a simultaneous-move stage game. Player one monitors the stage- game actions of player two imperfectly, while player two monitors the pure stage- game actions of player one perfectly. Player one’s type is...

This paper studies repeated games where the time of repetitions of the stage game is not known or controlled by the players. Many economic situations of interest where players repeatedly interact share this feature, players do not know exactly when is the next time they will be called to play...

Sannikov (2007) investigates properties of perfect public equilibria in continuous time repeated games. This note points out that the proof of the main theorem (Theorem 2) needs some corrections. I show that the main theorem holds as it is with suitable modifications of Lemmata 5 and 6.