This study investigates the choice between complementary and parallel alliances in a market with vertical and horizontal externalities. One composite goods firm competes with two components producers, each providing a complementary component of a differentiated com- posite good. Although the...

Using a team-production model with heterogeneous workers, we examine the short- and long-run efficiency effects of skill diversity and leadership in teams. Our analysis focuses on workers' strategic incentives to manipulate their skills. In the short run, heterogeneous pairing (pairing workers...

We investigate the social desirability of free entry in the co-opetition model in which firms compete in a homogeneous product market while sharing common property resources that affect market size or consumers' willingness to pay for products. We show that free entry leads to socially excessive...

In this paper, we construct a political-economy model of international noncooperative environmental policymaking, and examine the strategic incentives for voters to elect an environmental policymaker in open economies. We show that under several circumstances, citizens have an incentive to...

This paper investigates the welfare effects of international transfers of environmental technologies in open economies with international oligopoly and transboundary pollution, and shows that policy differentiation between the donor and recipient countries and/or product differentiation between...

This paper investigates firm incentives for developing environmentally clean technologies in a simple two-country model with international oligopoly, and compares them under price and quantity regulations with and without policy cooperation between governments. Under any policy regime, whether...

In this paper, we endogenize the timing of policymaking in a simple two-country model of strategic environmental policy. We consider a timing game in which two policymakers non-cooperatively decide their preferred sequence of moves before setting emission tax rates. We show that whether the...

In this paper, we characterize optimal environmental policy in a case where innovation in clean production technologies is developed and provided by a monopoly. Two policy instruments are considered: an emission tax on downstream polluting firms and an R& D subsidy for an upstream innovator in...

Using a simple two-group model of the private provision of public goods, this paper investigates how endogenous formation of within-group cooperation is affected by different types and degrees of between-group interactions. We show that when between-group interactions are of the same directions...