This paper studies models where the optimal response functions under consideration are non-increasing in endogenous variables, and weakly increasing in exogenous parameters. Such models include games with strategic substitutes, and include cases where additionally, some variables may be...

The purpose of this paper is to reexamine the seminal belief elicitation experiment by Nyarko and Schotter (2002) under the prism of pattern recognition. Instead of modeling elicited beliefs by a standard weighted fictitious play model this paper proposes a generalized variant of fictitious...

If asking subjects their beliefs during repeated game play changes the way those subjects play, using those stated beliefs to evaluate and compare theories of strategic behavior is problematic. We experimentally verify that belief elicitation can alter paths of play in a repeated asymmetric...

We analyze a team formation process that generalizes matching models and network formation models, allowing for overlapping teams of heterogeneous size. We apply different notions of stability: myopic team-wise stability, which extends to our setup the concept of pair-wise stability, coalitional...

A recent advance in our understanding of repeated PDs is the detection of a threshold d* at which laboratory subjects start to cooperate predictively. This threshold is substantially above the classic threshold "existence of Grim equilibrium" and has been characterized axiomatically by Blonski,...

The authors (Cason, Friedman and Hopkins, Review of Economic Studies, 2014) claimed that control treatments (using simultaneous matching in discrete time) replicate previous results that exhibit weak or no cycles. After correcting two mathematical mistakes in their cycles tripwire algorithm, we...

In a recent paper, Duersch et.al (2012) showed that in a rather broad class of repeated symmetric two-player games, a player who uses the simple "imitate-if-better" heuristic cannot be subject to a money pump. In this paper, we extend the analysis to games with randomly perturbed payoffs and we...

We study an example of infinitely repeated games in which symmetric duopolistic firms produce experience goods. After consuming the products, short-run consumers only observe imperfect public information about product quality. We characterize perfect public equilibrium payoff set E(δ) of firms...

We study an infinitely repeated game where two players with equal discount factors play a simultaneous-move stage game. Player one monitors the stage- game actions of player two imperfectly, while player two monitors the pure stage- game actions of player one perfectly. Player one’s type is...

This paper studies repeated games where the time of repetitions of the stage game is not known or controlled by the players. Many economic situations of interest where players repeatedly interact share this feature, players do not know exactly when is the next time they will be called to play...