This paper estimates the effects of Say-on-Pay (SoP); a policy that increases shareholder "voice" by providing shareholders with a regular vote on executive pay. We apply a regression discontinuity design to the votes on shareholder-sponsored SoP proposals. Adopting SoP leads to large increases...

According to the prior literature, family executives of family-controlled firms receive lower compensation than non-family executives. One of the key driving forces behind this is the existence of family members who are not involved in management, but own significant fraction of shares and...

Contextual factors are typically neglected in both theorizing and empirical tests on executive pay. The fast majority of empirical investigations use data from U.S. based firms. Theoretical implications are typically developed, understood and tested on the basis of the U.S. context. However, the...

Over the past century, the institution of capital and the process of its accumulation have been fundamentally transformed. By contrast, the theories that explain this institution and process have remained largely unchanged. The purpose of this paper is to address this mismatch. Using a broad...

This work is a PhD dissertation, written at the Department of Economics, McGill University. The thesis offers a new framework for inflation as a process of restructuring. Contrary to existing theories of inflation, which tend to take structure and institutions as given for the purpose of...

Review of the monograph A.I. Kazannik “Scientific organization of administrative work in state and municipal institutions in Russia” first published in limited edition in 2004.

Work motivation was and remained a "hot topic" for management and organizational behavior studies, as well as a major concern for practice of Human Resource Management. While such studies have evidenced a lot of factors of intrinsic and extrinsic motivation having different influences on...

We study optimal incentives in a principal-agent problem in which the agent's outside option is determined endogenously in a competitive labor market. In equilibrium, strong performance increases the agent's market value. When this value becomes sufficiently high, the threat of the agent's...