Showing 1 - 10 of 902
multi-player coordination game with conflicting preferences. Network structure matters but the interaction between network … coordination and distribution of coordinated outcomes across networks. But increasing the communication length improves both … efficiency an equity of coordination. In all treatments, coordination is mostly explained by convergence in communication. We …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008587475
We model a game similar to the interaction between an academic advisor and advisee. Like the classic cheap talk setup, an informed player sends information to an uninformed receiver who is to take an action which affects the payoffs of both sender and receiver. However, unlike the classic cheap...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005109552
We model an interaction between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver. Like the classic cheap talk setup, the informed player sends a message to an uninformed receiver who is to take an action which affects the payoffs of both players. However, unlike the classic cheap talk setup, the...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008543017
We model an interaction between an informed sender and an uninformed receiver. As in the classic cheap talk setup, the informed player sends a message to an uninformed receiver who is to take an action which affects the payoffs of both players. However, in our model the sender can communicate...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008855821
Using trust games, we study how promises and messages are used to build new trust where it did not previously exist and to rebuild damaged trust. In these games, trustees made non-binding promises of investment-contingent returns, then investors decided whether to invest, and finally trustees...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011108986
Crawford and Sobel (1982) developed a model of strategic information transmission in which a better-informed sender sends a possibly informative signal to a decision-making receiver and studied how strategically transmitted information is related to the analogy between the two players'...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005059106
Language is an imperfect and uneven means of communicating information about a complex and nuanced world. We run an experimental investigation of a setting in which the messages available to the sender imperfectly describe the state of the world, however the sender can improve communication, at...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008548823
Language is an imperfect and coarse means of communicating information about a complex and nuanced world. We run an experimental investigation of a setting in which the messages available to the sender imperfectly describe the state of the world, however the sender can improve communication, at...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10009018263
This paper analyzes a cheap talk model with heterogeneous receivers who are accountable for the correctness of their actions, showing that there exists a truth-revealing equilibrium. This sheds new light on the important role played by elections in shaping politicians' and, more surprisingly,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008574616
In this paper, we use experimental data to study players' stability in normal-form games where subjects have to report beliefs and to choose actions. Subjects saw each of 12 games four times in a regular or isomorphic form spread over two days without feedback. We document a high degree of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011107567