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Grochulski, Borys; Zhang, Yuzhe - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013

We study optimal incentives in a principal-agent problem in which the agent's outside option is determined endogenously in a competitive labor market. In equilibrium, strong performance increases the agent's market value. When this value becomes sufficiently high, the threat of the agent's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011108859

Gouvernance optimale moderne des universités

Jellal, Mohamed - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

This paper is a theoretical introduction to modern governance of universities in developing countries. Indeed, adopting the approach of the paradigm of the theory of incentives Laffont and Tirole (1993), this paper discusses the effects of the presence of information asymmetry between the State...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011108454

Multi-dimensional auctions under information asymmetry for costs and qualities

Papakonstantinou, A.; Bogetoft, P. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012

This paper discusses the design of a novel multi-dimensional mechanism which allows a principal to procure a single project or an item from multiple suppliers through a two-step payment. The suppliers are capable of producing different qualities at costs which cannot exceed a certain value and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011259763

Uberrimae Fidei and Adverse Selection: the equitable legal judgment of Insurance Contracts

Strauss, Jason David - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008

insureds to discover their risk type and/or educating potential insureds on the requirements of a contract of uberrimae fidei …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005619644

Contracting under Incomplete Information and Social Preferences: An Experimental Study

Hoppe, Eva I.; Schmitz, Patrick W. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2013

Principal-agent models in which the agent has access to private information before a contract is signed are a … cornerstone of contract theory. We have conducted an experiment with 720 participants to explore whether the theoretical insights … the principals make contract offers, they anticipate that social preferences affect agents' behavior. …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011110481

"Endogenous" Relative Concerns: The Impact of Workers' Characteristics on Status and Pro ts in the Firm

Ramalingam, Abhijit - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009

This paper explores the rationality of status concerns amongst co-workers and the impact of such rational status concerns on a firm's profits. We find that it is individually rational for agents in a firm to develop and exhibit status concerns. Workers are, by their choices of status concerns,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008540966

Repeated moral hazard and contracts with memory: The case of risk-neutrality

Ohlendorf, Susanne; Schmitz, Patrick W. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011

We consider a repeated moral hazard problem, where both the principal and the wealth-constrained agent are risk-neutral. In each of two periods, the agent can exert unobservable effort, leading to success or failure. Incentives provided in the second period act as carrot and stick for the first...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008839203

Multi-Tasking vs. Screening: A Model of Academic Tenure

Kou, Zonglai; Zhou, Min - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009

"incentivize" teaching activity is decreasing the incentive power to researching activity. This justifies the low-powered contract … to tenured professors. However, with low-powered contract, the university will face serious informational problem in the … from the potential occupational vacancy if the wage level is low. To this dilemma, the up-or-out contract is a possible …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008544697

On the fundamentals of winning virtuous strategies creation toward leveraged buyout transactions implementation during private equity investment in conditions of resonant absorption of discrete information in diffusion - type financial system with induced nonlinearities

Ledenyov, Dimitri O.; Ledenyov, Viktor O. - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

The authors perform an original research on the fundamentals of winning virtuous strategies creation toward the leveraged buyout transactions implementation during the private equity investment in the conditions of the resonant absorption of discrete information in the diffusion - type financial...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011107335

Delegation to potentially uninformed agent

Semenov, Aggey - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2012

We consider a delegation problem with a potentially uninformed agent when the principal cannot use monetary payments. If the bias between the principal and the agent is large, then the optimal delegation set is an interval. When the bias is small or medium however, the optimal delegation set is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011107725