Foreign aid critics, supporters, recipients, and donors have produced eloquent rhetoric on the need for better aid practices— has this translated into reality? This paper attempts to monitor the best and worst of aid practices among bilateral, multilateral, and UN agencies. We create aid...

Using the principal-agent- supervisor paradigm, this paper examines the occurrence of collusion in a setting where the principal has no information about the supervisor and the agent does not necesarily know the supervisor’s preferences.We formally prove the occurrence of collusion is more...

The paper uses a panel of athletic department revenue and expenditure data of 227 public colleges and universities to empirically investigate the behavior of NCAA Division I athletic departments over the period 2006 – 2011. Four primary hypotheses were tested: (1) the effect of revenue changes...

This is a note on corruption and underground economy in a Kaldor-type model of the business cycle. It appears that when the economy is booming and underground activities seek to enter the official economy, bureaucrats have the upper hand but until underground businesses cannot tolerate...

Using the principal-agent- supervisor paradigm, this paper examines the occurrence of collusion in a setting where the principal has no information about the supervisor and the agent does not necessarily know the supervisor’s preferences. We formally prove the occurrence of collusion is more...

Using the Principal-Agent-Supervisor paradigm, we examine in this paper how a tax collection agency changes optimal schemes in order to lessen the occurrence of bribery between the tax collector and the taxpayer. The Principal, who maximizes the expected net fiscal revenue, reacts by decreasing...

Everyone has a soft spot for pensioners. This probably explains most peoples’ unquestioning approval of pensioners’ travel concessions. However, it is argued here that concessions do not make sense because pensioners would be better off with the cash equivalent of their concessions....

An incentive-compatibility framework for regulating a monopolist with unknown costs is applied to the sponsor’s problem of monitoring a bureau. Following Mueller (1989), the bureau does not make take-it-or-leave-it budget proposals to the sponsor. Rather, the bureau must announce a marginal...