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Amegashie, J. Atsu - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2008

such as race, gender, or ethnicity is much less acceptable. Why? I develop a simple model of conflict which is driven by …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005790266

Conflict and Conflict Managment with Asymmetric Stakes (The Bad-Cop and the Good Cop part II)

Caruso, Raul - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2007

This paper considers a partial equilibrium model of conflict where two asymmetric, rational and risk-neutral opponents … instrument to affect the outcome of the conflict. The second instrument is assumed to capture positive investments in ‘conflict … for the measurement and evaluation of conflict and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005835709

Conflict and Conflict Management with Interdependent Instruments and Asymmetric Stakes,(The Good-Cop and the Bad-Cop Game)

Caruso, Raul - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2006

This paper considers a partial equilibrium model of conflict where two asymmetric, rational and risk-neutral opponents … option of choosing a second instrument to affect the outcome of the conflict. The second instrument is assumed to capture a … complex bundle of Conflict Management Procedures (CMPs). Through comparative statics, different scenarios are studied. A …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10005835785

It’s the weather, stupid! Individual participation in collective May Day demonstrations

Kurrild-Klitgaard, Peter - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2010

We investigate the possible explanations of variations in aggregate levels of participation in large-scale political demonstrations. A simple public choice inspired model is applied to data derived from the annual May Day demonstrations of the Danish labour movement and socialist parties taking...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10008784949

Strategically Equivalent Contests

Chowdhury, Subhasish; Sheremeta, Roman - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

Using a two-player Tullock-type contest we show that intuitively and structurally different contests can be strategically equivalent. Strategically equivalent contests generate the same best response functions and, as a result, the same equilibrium efforts. However, strategically equivalent...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011107976

An Analysis of Omitted Shareholder Proposals

Foley, Maggie; Cebula, Richard; Boylan, Robert - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

We intend to reveal the causes and the determinants of the omitted shareholder proposals. We find that individual investors are mostly likely to submit a proposal being excluded from the proxy ballot. Since individual investors are not so skillful as institutional investors, we summarize that...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011108270

Can more be less? An experimental test of the resource curse

Al-Ubaydli, Omar; McCabe, Kevin; Twieg, Peter - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

Several scholars have argued that abundant natural resources can be harmful to economic performance under bad institutions and helpful when institutions are good. These arguments have either been theoretical or based on naturally-occurring variation in natural resource wealth. We test this...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011108283

Contests with Random Noise and a Shared Prize

Sheremeta, Roman; Masters, William; Cason, Timothy - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2009

This note introduces a model of contests with random noise and a shared prize that combines features of Tullock (1980) and Lazear and Rosen (1981). Similar to results in Lazear and Rosen, as the level of noise decreases the equilibrium effort rises. As the noise variance approaches zero, the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011108366

Multiple Equilibria in Tullock Contests

Chowdhury, Subhasish; Sheremeta, Roman - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2011

We find the sufficient conditions for the existence of multiple equilibria in Tullock-type contests, and show that asymmetric equilibria arise even under symmetric prize and cost structures. We then present existing contests where multiple equilibria exist under reasonably weak conditions.

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011109224

Behavior in Contests

Sheremeta, Roman - Volkswirtschaftliche Fakultät, … - 2014

maximization, (3) bounded rationality, and (4) judgmental biases. These explanations are not exhaustive, but they provide a …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011109372