This paper introduces a new incentive compatible mechanism which for general preference environments implements Lindahl allocations as Nash equilibria. The mechanism does not increase in structural complexity as consumers are added to the economy, the minimum dimension of data needed to compute...

In a recent article, Hahn [Hahn, S. (2008). The convergence of fictitious play in games with strategic complementarities. Economics Letters 99, 2, 304-306] claims to prove convergence of fictitious play in games with strategic complementarities. I show here that the proof is flawed and...

This paper establishes relationships between static Nash equilibria and dynamic Markov perfect equilibria of tariff and quota retaliation games. In supermodular games where tariffs are strategic complements, the steady state of every, symmetric Markov perfect equilibrium must have lower tariffs...

This paper investigates how network relations, proximity and their interplay affect collaboration and their inventive performance. Using patent citations as a proxy for patent quality, we investigate how the network and proximity characteristics of co-inventors enable them to access different...

This paper investigates the determinants of co-inventor tie formation using micro-data on genomic patents from 1990 to 2006 in France. In a single analysis, we consider the relational and proximity perspectives that are usually treated separately. In order to do so, we analyse various forms of...

Institutions are the equilibrium states of games, and the emergence of institutions is an evolutionary, stochastic, and (social) structural dependence process of interactions among agents. In this paper, we address the relationship between the institutional emergence and the structure of social...

We study the dynamics of a game-theoretic network formation model that yields large-scale small-world networks. So far, mostly stochastic frameworks have been utilized to explain the emergence of these networks. On the other hand, it is natural to seek for game-theoretic network formation models...

We present a network formation model based on a particularly interesting class of networks in social settings, where individuals' positions are determined according to a topic-based or hierarchical taxonomy. In this game-theoretic model, players are located in the leaves of a complete b-ary tree...

We develop a simple model to study the coevolution of interaction structures and action choices in prisoners' dilemma games. Agents are boundedly rational and choose both actions and interaction partners via payoff-biased imitation. The dynamics of imitation and exclusion yields polymorphic...

Transaction cost economics explains organizations in a simplistic ‘market-vs.-hierarchy’ dichotomy. In this view, complex real-world coordination forms are simply considered ‘hybrids’ of those ‘pure’ and ideal forms, thus being located on a one-dimensional ‘line’ between them....