This paper studies a dynamic adjustment process in a large society of forward-looking agents where payoffs are given by a normal form supermodular game. The stationary states of the dynamics correspond to the Nash equilibria of the stage game. It is shown that if the stage game has a monotone...

When there is strategic complementarity of consumption between neighbors in a social network, we find that certain consumers may have a bigger impact than other consumers on the market demand and therefore the equilibrium price. The influence that a particular consumer has on the market demand...

This paper studies a dynamic adjustment process in a large society of forward-looking agents where payoffs are given by a normal form supermodular game. The stationary states of the dynamics correspond to the Nash equilibria of the stage game. It is shown that if the stage game has a monotone...

This paper shows that a hybrid of the sticky-price and sticky-information models of price adjustment is able to deliver a hump-shaped inflation response to monetary shocks without counterfactually implying, as in Mankiw and Reis (2002) or Altig et al. (2005), that individual firms' prices change...

I show that in a setting with costly information processing, strategic complementarity in pricing, by generating planning complementatrities, results in the aggregate price responding slowly to nominal shocks even though individual firm prices change by large amounts in response to idiosyncratic...

Let a preference ordering on a lattice be perturbed. As is well known, single crossing conditions are necessary and sufficient for a monotone reaction of the set of optimal choices from every chain. Actually, there are several interpretations of monotonicity and several corresponding single...