identical for both sender and receiver. Additionally, the sender incurs a communication cost which is increasing in the … applied to the case where communication is costless but preferences diverge. Additionally, we model the competency of the … decreasing in the likelihood of the mistake. When the preferences between players diverge and when there are communication costs …

particular, the sender has a finite set of message elements with which to compose messages. The sender incurs a communication … uniqueness and we provide an example where an increase in communication costs can improve communication. As we show in an example … payoffs in mediated communication. …

where an increase in communication costs can improve communication. As we show this improvement can occur to such an extent … that an equilibrium outperforms the Goltsman et. al. (2009) upper bound for payoffs in mediated communication. …

, however the sender can improve communication, at a cost, by increasing the complexity or elaborateness of the message. As is … standard in the communication literature, the sender learns the state of the world then sends a message to the receiver. The … expected, we find that larger communication costs are associated with worse outcomes for both sender and receiver. Consistent …

, however the sender can improve communication, at a cost, by increasing the complexity or elaborateness of the message. As is … standard in the communication literature, the sender learns the state of the world then sends a message to the receiver. The … the size of the language endogenously arises as a function of the costs of communication. Specifically, we find that …