Due to the high costs of conflict both in theory and practice, we examine and experimentally test the conditions under which conflict between asymmetric agents can be resolved. We model conflict as a two-agent rent-seeking contest for an indivisible prize. Before conflict arises, both agents may...

This paper faces two questions concerning Joint Ventures (JV) agreements. First, we study how the partners contribution affect the creation and the profit sharing of a JV when partners' effort is not observable. Then, we see whether such agreements are easier to enforce when the decision on JV...

The vector space model facilitates a very useful representation of the strategic interaction in trade because it is possible to incorporate both symmetric and asymmetric features of the players. This paper characterizes the Nash solution of the non-cooperative international trade game in the...

The HMR model extends the classical gravity model of trade to correct for the large number of zeros in the world trade matrix (export selection) and for the unobservable fraction of exporting fi�rms (extensive margin). They �find that, while omission of both of these corrections result in...

In most manufacturing industries output is adjusted in a lumpy way along three margins: shiftwork, weekend work, and closing a plant temporarily down. We incorporate such decisions into a dynamic general equilibrium model and study: (i) if such micro-level nonconvexities magnify business cycles;...