We consider the role of asymmetric information on the emergenceof collusion between criminals and enforcers, in the framework proposed by Bowles and Garoupa (1997) and Polinsky and Shavell (2001). Our paper proposes that the optimal criminal sanction for the underlying o®ense is not necessarily...

This paper modifies a standard model of law enforcement to allow for learning by doing. We incorporate the process of enforcement learning by assuming that the agency’s current marginal cost is a decreasing function of its past experience of detecting and convicting. The agency accumulates...

We show that the probability of apprehension and punishment is usually reduced in a framework with asymmetric information, leading to more offenses being committed. A positive correlation between crime and asymmetry of information in the enforcement process is established. Some suggestions...

This purpose of our paper is to explores the consequences of uncertainty on the remittances.These transfers are sent by a diaspora of emigrants who are motivated by altruism rather than pure self-interest. Migrants are assumed to care about the consumption of home-resident family members as well...

The main purpose of this paper is to study the economic behavior of migrants under uncertainty . We show , in particular, that the impact of the probability of return remains ambiguous regarding both the savings and labor participation of the migrants , this theoritical finding seems to...

In this paper, we examine the old-age security hypothesis according to which parents rear children because they expect the latter to care for them in their later years. In developing countries where there are no perfect capital markets, children are usually viewed as a potential source of income...

We analyze a situation where an antitrust authority delegates to an audit inspector the mission of gathering the sufficient information to condemn a cartel. The authority has two instruments at her disposal: rewarding the inspector with a proportion of the collected fine or providing him with...

Using the principal-agent- supervisor paradigm, this paper examines the occurrence of collusion in a setting where the principal has no information about the supervisor and the agent does not necessarily know the supervisor’s preferences. We formally prove the occurrence of collusion is more...

In this paper, we consider a model that suggests that the theory of exchange with asymmetric information seems suitable to provide a possible explanation model of occurrence and duration of civil wars. We show that although civil conflicts are not Pareto optimal ex post they may be Pareto...

This paper highlights formally the interaction existing between the quality of institutional governance, the education sector and economic growth. More fundamentally, we show how the quality of institutional governance matters in giving directly the appropriate incentives for human capital...