Prior literature has shown that, for a symmetric information setting, supplier encroachment into a reseller's market can mitigate double marginalization and benefit both the supplier and the reseller. This paper extends the investigation of supplier encroachment to the environment where the...

It has been recognized that when a durable goods manufacturer sells its output, it has an incentive to produce at a rate that will drive down the market price of the product over time. Because anticipation of declining prices makes consumers less willing to invest in owning the durable good,...

In this paper, we study a service network in which an agency is responsible for satisfying a constraint on the expected waiting and service time experienced by customers. However, the agency does not render the actual service. Instead, it serves to coordinate independently operated facilities....

This paper addresses the problem of jointly determining prices and production schedules for a set of items that are produced on the same production equipment. Under the assumptions that the production setup costs are negligible and that demand is seasonal but price dependent, we exploit the...

Manufacturers often use returns policies to encourage retailers to stock and price items more aggressively. We focus on the effect that such policies have on both a retailer's and a manufacturer's profits when the retailer must commit prior to the selling season to both a stocking quantity and a...

Many durable products cannot be used without a contingent consumable product, e.g., printers require ink, iPods require songs, razors require blades, etc. For such products, manufacturers may be able to lock in consumers by making their products incompatible with consumables that are produced by...

Based on a supply chain framework, we study the stocking decision of a downstream buyer who receives private demand information and has the incentive to influence her capital market valuation. We first characterize a market equilibrium under a general, single buyback contract. We show that the...

We study how a manager's short-term interest in the firm's market value may motivate channel stuffing: shipping excess inventory to the downstream channel. Channel stuffing allows a manager to report sales in excess of demand in order to influence investors' valuation of the firm. We apply an...