A real-effort experiment is investigated in which supervisors have to rate the performance of individual workers who in turn receive a bonus payment based on these ratings. We compare a baseline treatment in which supervisors are not restricted in their rating behavior to a forced distribution...

The connection between strategic change and managerial turnover is studied within a model where managers decide on a firm's strategy. Managers as well as firm owners care for the long-term success of a company, but managers are also interested in their own reputation. Due to reputational...

Online reputation -"feedback"- mechanism aim to mitigate the moral hazard problem associated with spatially distant exchange among strangers by providing traders with the type of information available in small groups, where members are frequently involved in another's dealings. We compare...

Reciprocity in feedback giving distorts the production and content of reputation information in a market, hampering trust and trade efficiency. Guided by feedback patterns observed on eBay and other platforms, we run laboratory experiments to investigate how reciprocity can be managed by changes...

We compare how experienced procurement managers and students solve the newsvendor problem. We find that managers broadly exhibit the same kind of pull-to-center bias as students do. Also, managers use information and task training no better than students. The performance of managers is...

Electronic reputation or "feedback" mechanisms aim to mitigate the moral hazard problems associated with exchange among strangers by providing the type of information available in more traditional close-knit groups, where members are frequently involved in one another's dealings. In this paper,...