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A canonical procedure is described, which associates to each infinite information collecting situation a related information collecting situation with finite state and action spaces, in such a way that the two corresponding IC-games are near to each other. Compensations for informants are then...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010999716
of the core of a game on a convex geometry. First, we show that if a game is quasi-convex, then the core is stable. This … result can be seen as an extension of a result by Shapley for traditional cooperative games. Secondly, we show the core on …, we axiomatize the core by means of consistency, as is analogous to a result by Peleg for traditional cooperative games …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010950112
Finding a solution concept is one of the central problems in cooperative game theory, and the notion of core is the …, one or several players with all their subordinates. In these situations, the core in its usual formulation may be … unbounded, making its use difficult in practice. We propose a new notion of core, called the restricted core, which imposes …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010950177
A Harsanyi payoff vector (see Vasil’ev in Optimizacija Vyp 21:30–35, 1978) of a cooperative game with transferable utilities is obtained by some distribution of the Harsanyi dividends of all coalitions among its members. Examples of Harsanyi payoff vectors are the marginal contribution...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010999683
-home allocation, both inspired by the painting story in Maschler et al. (1995) . We show, in a constructive way, that the core equals … alternative proof of the fact that the core of a standard fixed tree game equals the set of weighted Shapley values. The class of …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010999533
modifications of the Shapley value. We axiomatically characterize these two solutions and study their relation to the strong core …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010999560
Ausgehend von kontinuierlichen 1-Standortproblemen wird in diesem Paper eine neue Klasse von kostenbasierten TU-Spielen eingeführt. Es werden einige hinreichende Bedingungen präsentiert unter denen ein Spiel in dieser Klasse einen nicht-leeren Kern hat. Weiterhin werden Zuordnungsregeln für...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010999629
We prove that both the nucleolus and the core-center, i.e., the mass center of the core, of an m-sided Böhm …-Bawerk assignment market can be respectively computed from the nucleolus and the core-center of a convex game defined on the set of m … agents but one need to be taken into account. All these results simplify the computation of the nucleolus and the core …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010999651
interval uncertainty. The core, balancedness, superadditivity and related topics are studied. Solutions called ψ <Superscript …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010999653
Let T = (V, E) be a tree. A core of T is a path P, for which the sum of the weighted distances from all vertices to … weights. We prove that, when the sum of the weights of vertices is negative, the core must be a single vertex and that, when … the sum of the vertices’ weights is zero there exists a core that is a vertex. Morgan and Slater (J Algorithms 1 …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010999781