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A class of cooperative TU-games arising from shortest path problems is introduced and analyzed. Some conditions under which a shortest path game is balanced are obtained. Also an axiomatic characterization of the Shapley value for this class of games is provided. Copyright Springer-Verlag Berlin...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010999810
In this note we show that the mathematical tools of cooperative game theory allow a successful approach to the statistical problem of estimating a density function. Specifically, any random sample of an absolutely continuous random variable determines a transferable utility game, the Shapley...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010999589
In this note we use the Shapley value to define a valuation function. A valuation function associates with every non-empty coalition of players in a strategic game a vector of payoffs for the members of the coalition that provides these players’ valuations of cooperating in the coalition. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010999608
Inventory cost games are introduced in Meca et al. (1999). These games arise when considering the possibility of joint ordering in n-person EOQ inventory situations. Moreover, the SOC-rule is introduced and analysed as a cost allocation rule for this type of situations. In the current paper it...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010999695
In this paper we consider a cost allocation problem arising in a consortium for urban solid wastes collection and disposal. A classical allocation rule is the proportional division according to the volume of wastes collected; here we propose a different allocation method, rooted in game theory,...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010950125
A class of cooperative games arising from economic and operations research situations in which agents with potential individual possibilities are connected via a hierarchy within an organization is introduced. It is shown that the games in this class form a cone which lies in the intersection of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010999969
Kalai and Zemel introduced a class of flow-games showing that these games have a non-empty core and that a minimum cut corresponds to a core allocation.  We consider flow-games with a finite number of players on a network with infinitely many arcs: assuming that the total sum of the capacities...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10011000000