We consider the problem of manipulation of elections using positional voting rules under impartial culture voter behaviour. We consider both the logical possibility of coalitional manipulation, and the number of voters who must be recruited to form a manipulating coalition. It is shown that the...

We study a basic sequential model for the formation of winning coalitions in a simple game, well known from its use in defining the Shapley–Shubik power index. We derive in a uniform way a family of measures of collective and individual decisiveness in simple games, and show that, as for the...

In this paper we give structural characterizations of disjunctive and conjunctive hierarchical simple games by characterizing them as complete games with a unique shift-maximal losing coalition, and a unique shift-minimal winning coalition, respectively. We prove canonical representation...

In this paper we give necessary and sufficient conditions for a simple game to have rough weights. We define two functions f(n) and g(n) that measure the deviation of a simple game from a weighted majority game and roughly weighted majority game, respectively. We formulate known results in terms...