In this paper, we pursue the line of research initiated by Haller and Sarangi (2005). We examine the existence of equilibrium networks called Nash networks in the non-cooperative two-way flow model by Bala and Goyal (2000a,b) in the presence of partner heterogeneity. First, we show through an...

We investigate the Nash equilibria of game theoretic models of network formation based on explicit consent in link formation. These so-called “consent models” explicitly take account of link formation costs. We provide characterizations of Nash equilibria of such consent models under both...

In this paper we examine the properties of stable coalitions under sequential and simultaneous bargaining by competing labor unions. We do this using the Nash bargaining solution and various notions of stability, namely, Nash, coalitional, contractual and core stability.

We consider two different approaches to describe the formation of social networks under mutual consent and costly communication. First, we consider a network-based approach; in particular Jackson-Wolinsky's concept of pairwise stability. Next, we discuss a non-cooperative game-theoretic...