The goal of this article is to generalize the position value (Meessen, 1988) in order to take into account the negotiation powers of players on the allocation of the worth. These negotiation powers are formalized via a weight scheme similar to the one defined by Haeringer (2006). We define and...

If a player is removed from a game, what keeps the payoff of the remaining players unchanged? Is it the removal of a special player or its presence among the remaining players? This article answers this question in a complement study to Kamijo and Kongo (2012). We introduce axioms of invariance...

We study the set of allocation rules generated by component efficiency and weighted component fairness, a generalization of component fairness introduced by Herings et al. (2008). Firstly, if the underlying TU-game is superadditive, this set coincides with the core of a graph-restricted game...

We study farsighted coalitional stability in the context of TU-games. We show that every TU-game has a nonempty largest consistent set and that each TU-game has a von Neumann-Morgenstern farsighted stable set. We characterize the collection of von Neumann-Morgenstern farsighted stable sets. We...