Showing 1 - 10 of 15
This article examines real and nominal wage rigidities in West Germany. Using regionally disaggregated register data for 1975-2001, we estimate the extent of both types of wage rigidities from the observed distribution of individual wage changes, taking into account possible measurement error....
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010897429
Wage rigidity - the observation that wages cannot be adjusted downwards - has important implications for labour markets and macroeconomic performance. Empirical evidence on the extent, causes and consequences of wage rigidity on the individual level is relatively scant, however. This Feature...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010897662
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We report on several experiments on the optimal allocation of ownership rights. The experiments confirm the property rights approach by showing that the ownership structure affects relationship-specific investments and that subjects attain the most efficient ownership allocation despite starting...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010762373
We show experimentally that fairness concerns may have a decisive impact on the actual and optimal choice of contracts in a moral hazard context. Bonus contracts that offer a voluntary and unenforceable bonus for satisfactory performance provide powerful incentives and are superior to explicit...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010897454
This paper examines how the presence of a non-negligible fraction of reciprocally fair actors changes the provision of incentives through contracts. We provide experimental evidence that principals have a strong preference for less complete contracts although the standard self-interest model...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010897526
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This paper reports on a two-task principal agent experiment in which only one task is contractible. The principal can either offer a piece-rate contract or a (voluntary) bonus to the agent. Bonus contracts strongly outperform piece-rate contracts. Many principals reward high effort on both tasks...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010897600
In this paper we reply to Binmore and Shaked’s criticism of the Fehr-Schmidt model of inequity aversion. We put the theory and their arguments into perspective and show that their criticism is not substantiated. Finally, we briefly comment on the main challenges for future research on social...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10010897626