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Do Managerial Objectives Drive Bad Acquisitions?
Morck, Randall - 2013
the announcement day return of bidding firms. The returns to bidding shareholders are lower when their firm diversifies …, when it buys a rapidly growing target , and when the performance of its managers has been poor before the acquisition …. These results are consistent with the proposition that managerial rather than shareholders' objectives drive bad …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012753943
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Powerful Independent Directors
Fogel, Kathy - 2015
cash flow retention, more CEO accountability, and less earnings management. We posit that more powerful independent … errant top managers, or both …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013034382
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Finance and Governance in Developing Economies
Morck, Randall - 2011
Classic Big Push industrialization envisions state planners coordinating economic activity to internalize a range of externalities that otherwise lock in a low-income equilibrium, but runs afoul of well-known government failure problems. Successful Big Push coordination may occur instead when a...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013128601
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Agency Problems and the Fate of Capitalism
Morck, Randall - 2010
Economics has firms maximizing value and people maximizing utility, but firms are run by people. Agency theory concerns the mitigation of this internal contradiction in capitalism. Firms need charters, regulations and laws to restrain those entrusted with their governance, just as economies need...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013136737
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The Great Pyramids of America : A Revised History of Us Business Groups, Corporate Ownership and Regulation, 1930-1950
Kandel, Eugene - 2013
Most listed firms are freestanding in the U.S, while listed firms in other countries often belong to business groups: lasting structures in which listed firms control other listed firms. Hand-collected historical data illuminate how the present ownership structure of the United States arose: (1)...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013071909
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Governance and Stakeholders
Mehrotra, Vikas - 2017
wealth maximization derived from shareholders' status as residual claimants are vulnerable on several fronts. Share … quasirents, expected earnings beyond expected costs of capital from investors, to which shareholders have no obvious claim. Other … made firm-specific investments, may exert stronger claims than atomistic public shareholders have to shares of their firms …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012954931
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The Global History of Corporate Governance : An Introduction
Steier, Lloyd - 2013
This paper presents a synopsis of recent NBER studies of the history of corporate governance in Canada, China, France, Germany, Japan, India, Italy, the Netherlands, Sweden, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Together, the studies underscore the importance of path dependence, often as...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012754560
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Corporate Governance, Economic Entrenchment and Growth
Morck, Randall - 2013
agency and entrenchment problem simultaneously. In addition, controlling shareholders can divert corporate resources for …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012754592
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Alternative Mechanisms for Corporate Control
Morck, Randall - 2013
We examine performance and management characteristics of Fortune 500 firms experiencing one of three types of control … change: internally precipitated management turnover, hostile takeover, and friendly takeover. We find that firms experiencing … internally precipitated management turnover perform poorly relative to other firms in their industries, but are not concentrated …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012754746
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Never Waste a Good Crisis : an Historical Perspective on Comparative Corporate Governance
Morck, Randall - 2013
Different economies at different times use different institutional arrangements to constrain the people entrusted with allocating the economy's capital and other resources. Comparative financial histories show these corporate governance regimes to be largely stable through time, but capable of...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013095868