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Economic Analysis of Welfare Economics, Morality and the Law

Shavell, Steven - 2022

This paper contains the chapters on welfare economics, morality, and the law from a general, forthcoming book, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law (Harvard University Press, 2003). I begin in chapter 26 with a discussion of the normative foundations of economic analysis, namely, the subject...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014084957

Economic Analysis of Public Law Enforcement and Criminal Law

Shavell, Steven - 2022

enforcement are discussed in the chapters that follow. In chapter 20, the basic theory of public enforcement employing monetary … sanctions is discussed; in chapter 21, the basic theory of enforcement using nonmonetary sanctions is examined; and in chapter … 22, extensions to the basic theory are considered. Then, in chapter 23, functions of sanctions apart from deterrence …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014084960

The Rationale for Motions in the Design of Adjudication

Shavell, Steven - 2018

The conduct of adjudication is often influenced by motions––requests made by litigants to modify the course of adjudication. The question studied in this article is why adjudication is designed so as to permit the use of motions. The answer developed is that litigants will naturally know a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012916625

Reconciling Asymmetric Information and Divergent Expectations Theories of Litigation

Waldfogel, Joel - 2021

Both asymmetric information (AI) and divergent expectations (DE) theories offer possible explanations of the litigation puzzle. Under DE, cases proceed to trial when, by chance, the plaintiff is more optimistic than the defendant. As the fraction of cases tried (T) declines, this leads to a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013220528

Economic Analysis of the General Structure of the Law

Shavell, Steven - 2021

This paper contains a chapter on the general structure of the law from a forthcoming book, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law (Harvard University Press, 2003). In this chapter, I consider basic features of the legal system, including whether the law directly constrains behavior or channels...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013220934

Economic Analysis of Accident Law

Shavell, Steven - 2021

Accident law is the body of legal rules governing the ability of victims of harm to sue and to collect payments from those who injured them. This paper contains the chapters on accident law from a general, forthcoming book, Foundations of Economic Analysis of Law (Harvard University Press,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013221850

The Government as Litigant : Further Tests of the Case Selection Model

Eisenberg, Theodore; Farber, Henry S. - 2021

We develop a model of the plaintiff's decision to file a law suit that has implications for how differences between the federal government and private litigants and litigation translate into differences in trial rates and plaintiff win rates at trial. Our case selection model generates a set of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013224180

The Litigious Plaintiff Hypothesis : Case Selection and Resolution

Eisenberg, Theodore; Farber, Henry S. - 2021

results that are generally consistent with the theory. Lawsuits where the plaintiff is an individual are found to have higher …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013224186

Decoupling Liability : Optimal Incentives for Care and Litigation

Polinsky, Alan Mitchell; Che, Yeon-Koo - 2021

A "decoupled" liability system is one in which the award to the plaintiff differs from the payment by the defendant. The optimal system of decoupling makes the defendant's payment as high as possible. Such a policy allows the award to the plaintiff to be lowered, thereby reducing the plaintiff's...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013224692

Private Versus Public Enforcement of Fines

Polinsky, A. Mitchell - 2021

The present paper analyzes the competitive, monopolistic, and public enforcement of fines allowing for the costs of enforcement to differ by the choice of the enforcer. There are a number of reasons to expect such differences. First, the benefits from coordinating enforcement -- for example,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013224885