We study the incentives that governments have to protect intellectual property in a trading world economy. We consider a world economy with ongoing innovation in two countries that differ in market size, in their capacities for innovation, and in their absolute and comparative advantage in...

Price controls create opportunities for international arbitrage. Many have argued that such arbitrage, if tolerated, will undermine intellectual property rights and dull the incentives for investment in research-intensive industries such as pharmaceuticals. We challenge this orthodox view and...

Suppose that an opportunity arises for two countries to negotiate a free trade agreement (FTA). Will an FTA between these countries be politically viable? And if so, what form will it take? We address these questions using a political-economy framework that emphasizes the interaction between...

In this paper, we examine one channel through which the trade regime might affect growth in the long run. We model endogenous technological progress that results from profit maximizing investments by far-sighted entrepreneurs. Productivity in the research lab depends upon the "stock of knowledge...

We develop a multi-country, dynamic general equilibrium model of product innovation and international trade to study the creation of comparative advantage through research and development and the evolution of world trade over tune. In our model, firms must incur resource costs to introduce new...

Misinformation pervades political competition. We introduce opportunities for political candidates and their media supporters to spread fake news about the policy environment and perhaps about parties' positions into a familiar model of electoral competition. In the baseline model with full...

We explore the possibility that a global productivity slowdown is responsible for the widespread decline in the labor share of national income. In a neoclassical growth model with endogenous human capital accumulation a la Ben Porath (1967) and capital-skill complementarity a la Grossman et al....

We characterize trade policies that result from political competition when assessments of well-being include both material and psychosocial components. The material component reflects, as usual, satisfaction from consumption. Borrowing from social identity theory, we take the psychosocial...

We investigate whether a welfare-maximizing government ought to pursue a program of" strategic trade intervention or instead commit itself to free trade when domestic firms will have an opportunity to manipulate the government's choice of the level of" intervention. Domestic firms may overinvest...

We develop a model of repeated product improvements in a continuum of sectors. Each product follows a stochastic progression up a quality ladder. Progress is not uniform across sectors, so an equilibrium distribution of qualities evolves over time. But the rate of aggregate growth is constant....