I prove that the joint distribution of random coefficients and additive errors is identified in a mulltinomial choice model. No restrictions are imposed on the support of the random coefficients and additive errors. The proof uses large support variation in choice-specific explanatory variables...

We explore the identification of nonseparable models without relying on the property that the model can be inverted in the econometric unobservables. In particular, we allow for infinite dimensional unobservables. In the context of a demand system, this allows each product to have multiple...

We study a variant of a random utility model that takes a probability distribution over preference relations as its primitive. We do not model products using a space of observed characteristics. The distribution of preferences is only partially identified using cross-sectional data on varying...

We explore a nonparametric mixtures estimator for recovering the joint distribution of random coefficients in economic models. The estimator is based on linear regression subject to linear inequality constraints and is computationally attractive compared to alternative, nonparametric estimators....

This paper studies nonparametric identification in binary choice games of complete information. We allow for correlated unobservables across players. We propose conditions under which the binary choice game is a so-called potential game and impose that the selected equilibrium maximizes its...

We propose a simple nonparametric mixtures estimator for recovering the joint distribution of parameter heterogeneity in economic models, such as the random coefficients logit. The estimator is based on linear regression subject to linear inequality constraints, and is robust, easy to program...

I study a many-to-many, two-sided, transferable-utility matching game. Consider data on matches or relationships between agents but not on the choice set of each agent. I investigate what economic parameters can be learned from data on equilibrium matches and agent characteristics. Features of a...

I estimate the relative magnitudes of worker switching costs and how much the employer switching of experienced engineers responds to outside wage offers. Institutional features imply that voluntary turnover dominates switching in the market for Swedish engineers from 1970--1990. I use data on...

I explore the estimation of transferable utility matching games, encompassing many-to-many matching, marriage and matching with trading networks (trades). I introduce a matching maximum score estimator that does not suffer from a computational curse of dimensionality in the number of agents in a...

We show how to nonparametrically identify the distribution that characterizes heterogeneity among agents in a general class of structural choice models. We introduce an axiom that we term separability and prove that separability of a structural model ensures identification. The main strength of...