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Who's Paying Attention? Measuring Common Ownership and its Impact on Managerial Incentives

Gilje, Erik P. - 2019

We derive a measure that captures the extent to which overlapping ownership structures shift managers' incentives to … ownership overlap, including mergers in the asset management industry and the growth of indexing, could in fact diminish … possibility that the growth of common ownership has had a significant impact on managerial incentives.Institutional subscribers to …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012890898

Do Firms in Countries with Poor Protection of Investor Rights Hold More Cash?

Pinkowitz, Lee - 2012

Managers make different decisions in countries with poor protection of investor rights and poor financial development. One possible explanation is that shareholder-wealth maximizing managers face different tradeoffs in such countries (the tradeoff theory). Alternatively, firms in such countries...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012755812

Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs, Opioid Abuse, and Crime

Dave, Dhaval - 2018

We study the spillover effects of prescription drug monitoring programs (PDMPs) on crime, and in the process inform how policies that restrict access to Rx opioids per se within the healthcare system would impact broader non-health domains. In response to the substantial increase in opioid use...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012911712

The Problem of Data Quality in Analyses of Opioid Regulation : The Case of Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs

Horwitz, Jill R. - 2018

States, which have the primary legal role in regulating the prescribing and dispensing of prescription medications, have created Prescription Drug Monitoring Programs (PDMP) to try to reduce inappropriate prescribing, dispensing, and related harm. Research assessing whether these interventions...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012911717

Government Decentralization Under Changing State Capacity : Experimental Evidence from Paraguay

Dal Bo, Ernesto - 2018

Standard models of hierarchy assume that agents and middle managers are better informed than principals about how to implement a particular task. We estimate the value of the informational advantage held by supervisors – middle managers – when ministerial leadership – the principal –...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012913385

Monitoring Works : Getting Teachers to Come to School

Duflo, Esther; Hanna, Rema - 2021

In the rural areas of developing countries, teacher absence is a widespread problem. This paper tests whether a simple incentive program based on teacher presence can reduce teacher absence, and whether it has the potential to lead to more teaching activities and better learning. In 60 informal...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013223077

Prison Crowding, Recidivism, and Early Release in Early Rhode Island

Bodenhorn, Howard - 2021

Prison overcrowding is a perennial problem and several states are under court order to reduce crowding. The long-term solution to crowding has been more prisons. The short-term solution is early release. Early release programs can be effective when they balance the savings of reduced prison...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013224361

The Control of Politicians in Normal Times and Times of Crisis : Wealth Accumulation by U.S. Congressmen, 1850-1880

Querubin, Pablo - 2011

the decrease in control by the media and other monitors might have made it easier for incumbent congressmen to collect …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013117869

Why Do Voters Dismantle Checks and Balances?

Acemoglu, Daron; Robinson, James Alan; Torvik, Ragnar - 2011

Voters often dismantle constitutional checks and balances on the executive. If such checks and balances limit presidential abuses of power and rents, why do voters support their removal? We argue that by reducing politician rents, checks and balances also make it cheaper to bribe or influence...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013121590

The Political Economy of Indirect Control

Padró i Miquel, Gerard - 2010

This paper characterizes the efficient sequential equilibrium when a government uses indirect control to exert its … to exert direct control by intervening with an endogenously determined intensity of force which is costly to both players …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013147577