order to determine whether bid rigging occurred. Detection of collusion is possible because of limited participation in the … bid on most jobs. The apparent role of ring meetings prior to the auction was to designate a serious bidder, and its bid …

efficiency of both the Generalized Second Price auction (GSP, used by Google and Microsoft-Bing and Yahoo!) and the VCG mechanism … (used by Facebook). We find that, despite its well-known susceptibility to collusion, the VCG mechanism outperforms the GSP … auction both in terms of revenues and efficiency …

behavior of these firms is consistent with collusion. The estimated average effect of collusion on market prices is about six …

Ticketmaster. We first show theoretically that Ticketmaster's auction design, a novel variant of position auctions, has attractive … efficiency, revenue and no-arbitrage properties. Then, by combining primary-market auction data from Ticketmaster with secondary …

the type of auction considered. The equilibria of a static auction with this distribution of values is used to … characterize the equilibria of the dynamic auction, making this general class very tractable. As a result of the option of future … rebidding, early bids are shaded and under mild conditions increase toward the end of the auction. Our results are consistent …

incomplete bid data typically available to the auction designer in online auctions for advertising or e-commerce. This direct … auction observations needed in order for revenue under the estimated reserve price to approximate revenue under the optimal … reserve arbitrarily closely. This simple approach to estimating reserves may be particularly useful for auction design in Big …

This paper compares outcomes from informally negotiated oil and gas leases to those awarded via centralized auction. We …

data. Moreover, numerous innovations in auction-design features on platforms such as eBay have created excellent research …-now options) in online auctions, as well as some of the literature dealing with online-auction design (including stopping rules …

, versus the option of making the reserve public by using it as the minimum bid level. In a field experiment, we auction 50 … that secret reserve prices make us worse off as sellers, by reducing the probability of the auction resulting in a sale …, deterring serious bidders from entering the auction, and lowering the expected transaction price of the auction. We also present …