coalitions to provide public goods. Theory is ambiguous on the equilibrium coalition size and contribution rates. We examine the … emergence of coalitions, their size, and how uncertainty in public goods provision affects contribution levels and coalition … coalition to provide the good. Contrary a core theoretical result, we find that coalition size increases when the public good …

We study the formation of a ruling coalition in political environments. Each individual is endowed with a level of … political power. The ruling coalition consists of a subset of the individuals in the society and decides the distribution of … resources. A ruling coalition needs to contain enough powerful members to win against any alternative coalition that may …

may be provided by individual countries outside of a coalition structure. In contrast to much of the literature, we treat … the size of agents as heterogeneous. Size of a country does not affect the incentives for forming a coalition but it does …

the policies they can pursue are constrained by the identity of the coalition members. In the model, a formateur picks a … coalition and negotiates for the allocation of the surplus it is expected to generate. The formateur is free to change … generalized version of a Nash Bargaining Solution in which —in contrast to the standard solution— the coalition is endogenous and …

pessimistic conclusions from the theory: only few players form a coalition when the institution prescribes the full …, both along the extensive and intensive margin when coalition members can each suggest a minimum contribution level with the …

In this paper we examine exclusion accomplished by a coalition of firms—frequently, a coalition of suppliers and … 1880s, which was controlled by a complex coalition of refiners and wholesalers. We assess the incentives and conduct of the …

determine conditions for their uniqueness. We show how this framework can be applied in political economy, coalition formation …