This paper models the wage-contract negotiation procedure between a union and a firm as a sequential bargaining process in which the unionalso decides, in each period, whether or not to strike for the duration of that period. We show that there exist subgame-perfect equilibria in which the union...

We introduce the possibility of direct punishment by specialized enforcers into a model of community enforcement. Specialized enforcers need to be given incentives to carry out costly punishments. Our main result shows that, when the specialized enforcement technology is sufficiently effective,...

This paper provides a systematic analysis of identification in linear social interactions models. This is both a theoretical and an econometric exercise as the analysis is linked to a rigorously delineated model of interdependent decisions. We develop an incomplete information game that...

Why cooperation occurs when noncooperation appears to be individually rational has been an issue in economics for at least a half century. In the 1960's and 1970's the context was cooperation in the prisoner's dilemma game; in the 1980's concern shifted to voluntary provision of public goods; in...

This paper focuses on the relationship between public action and access to public goods. It begins by developing a simple model of collective action which is intended to capture the various mechanisms that are discussed in the theoretical literature on collective action. We argue that several of...

This paper studies bidding dynamics where values and bidding opportunities follow an unrestricted joint Markov process, independent across agents. Bids cannot be retracted, as is frequently the case in auctions. Our main methodological contribution is that we construct a mapping from this...

Though economists have made substantial progress toward formulating theories of collusion in industrial cartels that account for a variety of fact patterns, important puzzles remain. Standard models of repeated interaction formalize the observation that cartels keep participants in line through...

Are individuals who trust others better off than those who do not? Do trustworthy people prosper more than untrustworthy ones? We first pose these questions in a search model where individuals face repeated choices between trusting (initiating an investment transaction) and not trusting, and...

This paper proposes an estimation method for a repeated auction game under the presence of capacity contraints. The estimation strategy is computationally simple as it does not require solving for the equilibrium of the game. It uses a two stage approach. In the first stage the distribution of...

A long-standing debate centers on the role of the “Haves” and the “Have Nots” in litigation. It is often suggested that wealthier plaintiffs are more likely to be repeat players, who tend to prevail in disputes before the courts. Do wealthy repeat players indeed capture courts and...