The agents to whom shareholders delegate the management of corporate affairs may transfer value from shareholders to … managers. We question this view within its own analytical framework by studying, in a principal-agent model, the effects of … diversion overlooks a significant cost of such behavior. Many common modes of compensation can provide managers with incentives …

Do acquirors profit from acquisitions, or do CEOs overbid and destroy shareholder value? We propose a novel approach to … measuring the long-run returns to mergers. In a new data set of close bidding contests we use losers' post-merger performance to … closely comoving in the years before the contest, providing support for our approach to identification. After the merger, they …

constraints that act on these processes, leave managers with considerable power to shape their own pay arrangements. Examining the …

Managers' incentives may conflict with those of shareholders or creditors, particularly at leveraged, opaque banks … sufficiently resolve agency problems so that they can attract funding from outside shareholders and depositors. We examine banks …

responds more to increases in shareholders' return performance than to decreases. Further, this asymmetry is stronger when …

through time, allowing for the possibility of replacing a shirking manager; firms have many managers, constraining the amount …