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Protection for Sale with Imperfect Rent Capturing

Facchini, Giovanni - 2012

Structurally estimating the Grossman and Helpman (1994) model using coverage ratios that include non-tariff barriers leads to biased parameter estimates. We develop a quot;protection for salequot; theoretical framework consistent with the data, by explicitly allowing for non-tariff barriers....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012755693

Horizontal and Vertical Conflict : Experimental Evidence

Galiani, Sebastián - 2016

Two types of political conflicts of interest pervade many of the world's societies. A horizontal conflict of interest arises when different constituencies support different policies, while a vertical conflict of interest emerges when those in charge of running the government acquire and retain...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013001771

A Game Theoretic Foundation of Competitive Equilibria with Adverse Selection

Netzer, Nick - 2012

We construct a fully specified extensive form game that captures competitive markets with adverse selection. In particular, it allows firms to offer any finite set of contracts, so that cross-subsidization is not ruled out. Moreover, firms can withdraw from the market after initial contract...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013099130

A Comparison of Tournaments and Contracts

Green, Jerry; Stokey, Nancy L. - 2021

Tournaments, reward structures based on rank order, are compared with individual contracts in a model with one risk-neutral principal and many risk-averse agents. Each agents' output is a stochastic function of his effort level plus an additive shock term that is common to all the agents. The...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013232756

Political-Economy Arguments for a Uniform Tariff

Panagariya, Arvind; Rodrik, Dani - 2022

political motives for excessive protection. First, a free-rider effect may be conducive to less lobbying under a uniform tariff …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014118269

A Political-Economy Theory of Trade Agreements

Maggi, Giovanni; Rodríguez-Clare, Andrés - 2021

This paper presents a theory of trade agreements where "politics" play an central role. This stands in contrast with the standard theory, where even politically-motivated governments sign trade agreements only to deal with terms-of-trade externalities. We develop a model where governments may be...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013220537

How Elections Matter : Theory and Evidence from Environmental Policy

List, John A.; Sturm, Daniel - 2021

popular view that choices on secondary policy instruments are largely determined by lobbying, we find strong effects of …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013221877

Bureaucrats or Politicians?

Alesina, Alberto; Tabellini, Guido Enrico - 2021

Policies are typically chosen by politicians and bureaucrats. This paper investigates the e fficiency criteria for allocating policy tasks to elected policymakers (politicians) or non elected bureaucrats. Politicians are more efficient for tasks that do not involve too much specific technical...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013221989

Is Trade Policy for Sale? Congressional Voting on Recent Trade Bills

Baldwin, Robert E.; Magee, Christopher S. P. - 2021

This paper examines voting by members of Congress on three trade bills introduced in 1993 and 1994: the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), the agreements concluded in the Uruguay Round of multilateral trade negotiations (GATT), and most-favored nation status for China. We first review...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013224935

Judicial Lobbying : The Politics of Labor Law Constitutional Interpretation

Iaryczower, Matiás; Spiller, Pablo T.; Tommasi, Mariano - 2021

the judiciary. The resulting framework reconciles the theoretical literature of lobbying with the negative available … evidence on the impact of lobbying over legislative outcomes, and sheds light to the determinants of lobbying in separation …-of-powers systems. We provide conditions for judicial decisions to be sensitive to legislative lobbying, and find that lobbying falls …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013225056