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Hayashi, Fumio; Matsui, Akihiko - 2000

We present an infinite horizon model with capital in which fiat money and barter are two competing means of payment. Fiat money has value because barter is limited by the extent of a double coincidence of wants. The pattern of exchange generally involves both money and barter. We find that the...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014157957

Pairwise Kidney Exchange

Roth, Alvin E.; Sönmez, Tayfun; Ünver, M. Utku - 2021

In connection with an earlier paper on the exchange of live donor kidneys (Roth, Sonmez, and Unver 2004) the authors entered into discussions with New England transplant surgeons and their colleagues in the transplant community, aimed at implementing a Kidney Exchange program. In the course of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013237035

Efficient Kidney Exchange : Coincidence of Wants in a Structured Market

Roth, Alvin E.; Sönmez, Tayfun; Ünver, M. Utku - 2021

Patients needing kidney transplants may have willing donors who cannot donate to them because of blood or tissue incompatibility. Incompatible patient-donor pairs can exchange donor kidneys with other such pairs. The situation facing such pairs resembles models of the "double coincidence of...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013245132

Kidney Exchange

Roth, Alvin E.; Sönmez, Tayfun; Ünver, M. Utku - 2021

Most transplanted kidneys are from cadavers, but there are also substantial numbers of transplants from live donors. Recently, there have started to be kidney exchanges involving two donor-patient pairs such that each donor cannot give a kidney to the intended recipient because of immunological...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013230395

The Armington Assumption and the Size of Optimal Tariffs

Li, Chunding - 2015

trade theory …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013018307

Unpaired Kidney Exchange : Overcoming Double Coincidence of Wants Without Money

Akbarpour, Mohammad; Combe, Julien; He, Yinghua; … - 2022

For an incompatible patient-donor pair, kidney exchanges often forbid receipt-before-donation (the patient receives a kidney before the donor donates) and donation-before-receipt, causing a double-coincidence-of-wants problem. Our proposed algorithm, the Unpaired kidney exchange algorithm, uses...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013289109

Corporate Resilience to Banking Crises : The Roles of Trust and Trade Credit

Levine, Ross - 2016

Are firms more resilient to systemic banking crises in economies with higher levels of social trust? Using firm …-level data in 34 countries from 1990 through 2011, we find that liquidity-dependent firms in high-trust countries obtain more … trade credit and suffer smaller drops in profits and employment during banking crises than similar firms in low-trust …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012994912