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Tournaments, reward structures based on rank order, are compared with individual contracts in a model with one risk-neutral principal and many risk-averse agents. Each agents' output is a stochastic function of his effort level plus an additive shock term that is common to all the agents. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013232756
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013236722
This paper analyzes compensation schemes which pay according to an individual's ordinal rank in an organization rather than his output level. When workers are risk neutral, it is shown that wages based upon rank induce the same efficient allocation of resources as an incentive reward scheme...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013248434
altruism and marginal costs, and this heterogeneity is unobservable to the government. In a novel application of nonlinear … pricing methods, we theoretically characterize the optimal unrestricted contract in this screening environment with … multidimensional heterogeneity. We combine these results with the estimated model to construct the optimal contract and simulate …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013295075
enroll in a subsequent commitment contract after the original expires if they receive a nudge for a longer duration initial … contract. Our theoretical analysis of the welfare implications of these effects shows conditions under which nudges can reduce …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013018712
This paper identifies a class of multiperiod agency problems in which the optimal contract is tractable (attainable in … closed form). By modeling the noise before the action in each period, we force the contract to provide sufficient incentives … utility, a pecuniary cost of effort, Gaussian noise or continuous time. The contract's functional form is independent of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013150112
-sided asymmetric information on performance that allows for an arbitrary information structure. Two generic contract forms are studied …. An authority contract has the Principal reveal his information before the Agent responds with her information. Under such … a contract, the Agent's compensation varies only with the Principal's information, while her information is used to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012994910
the optimal contract and analyze how it changes with informativeness. We consider a standard agency model with risk …-neutrality and limited liability, where the optimal contract is a call option. The direct effect of reducing signal volatility is a …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013046171
efficiency is not attainable. We show that contracts involving mutual control might sometimes be superior to the best contract …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013222660
re-negotiated. Foreseeing this, the parties to the contract will write one that is renegotiation-proof. Under such a … contract, nominal shocks affect real consumption. Since the argument should apply in many situations, it will have …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013226072