consider the tradeoff between the benefits of direct bank monitoring to the firm and the costs of active bank involvement in …. Consistent with high potential costs of active bank involvement, we find that bankers tend to be represented on the boards of … implications for the current bank regulatory reform debate, such as whether to permit banks to own equity in non-financial firms …

errant top managers, or both …

outside directors than non- financial firms, and bank officer-directors tend to have more external board directorships than …- information cost firms are also more likely to borrow from their connected bank, and when they do so the terms of the loan appear …

decisions, directors' superior information, bargaining by management, pressures on managers to focus on the short …

We present a model in which managers are risk-averse and firms compete for scarce managerial talent ("alpha"). When … managers are not mobile across firms, firms provide efficient compensation, which allows for learning about managerial talent … and for insurance of low-quality managers. When instead managers can move across firms, firms cannot offer co …

This paper studies the role of bank affiliations in mitigating frictions related to asymmetric information. The … analysis focuses on Massachusetts, and tests whether firms with bank directors on their boards fared better following the Panic … percent of all non-financial corporations in the state had a bank director on their board in 1872. These firms survived the …