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Prendergast, Canice - 2010

Performance evaluations for workers are typically subjective impressions held by supervisors rather than easily quantifiable measures of output. We argue that perhaps the most important aspect this is that it gives supervisors the opportunity to exercise their personal preference towards their...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013139327

On the Role of Group Size in Tournaments : Theory and Evidence from Lab and Field Experiments

List, John A. - 2014

test of the theory implements a laboratory experiment, where important features of the theory can be exogenously imposed …. We begin with a theoretical exploration of optimal contest design, focusing on the number of competitors. Our theory …. We complement our lab experiment with a field experiment, where we rely on biological models complemented by economic …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013056205

Motivated Errors

Kessler, Judd B. (contributor) - 2019

In three sets of experiments involving over 4,200 subjects, we show that agents motivated to be selfish make systematic decision errors of the kind generally attributed to cognitive limitations or behavioral biases. We show that these decision errors are eliminated (or dramatically reduced) when...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012857671

Pay Inequality, Pay Secrecy, and Effort : Theory and Evidence

Charness, Gary; Kuhn, Peter Joseph - 2021

consequence, even though firms in our experiment tended to compress wages when wages became public information, this did not raise …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013239973

Institutions and Contract Enforcement

Falk, Armin - 2010

We provide evidence on how two important types of institutions -- dismissal barriers, and bonus pay -- affect contract enforcement behavior in a market with incomplete contracts and repeated interactions. Dismissal barriers are shown to have a strong negative impact on worker performance, and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012759359

Motivation and Incentives in Education : Evidence from a Summer Reading Experiment

Guryan, Jonathan - 2015

level of motivation to read. Elementary school students were mailed books weekly during the summer, mailed books and also …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013029018

Pay for Percentile

Barlevy, Gadi - 2011

We analyze an incentive pay scheme for educators that links educator compensation to the ranks of their students within appropriately defined comparison sets, and we show that under certain conditions this scheme induces teachers to allocate socially optimal levels of effort to all students....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013122652

Crowdsourcing City Government : Using Tournaments to Improve Inspection Accuracy

Glaeser, Edward L. - 2016

Can open tournaments improve the quality of city services? The proliferation of big data makes it possible to use predictive analytics to better target services like hygiene inspections, but city governments rarely have the in-house talent needed for developing prediction algorithms. Cities...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012995969

Intra Firm Bargaining and Shapley Values

Bruegemann, Bjoern - 2015

The paper revisits the problem of wage bargaining between a firm and multiple workers. We show that the Subgame Perfect Equilibrium of the extensive-form game proposed by Stole and Zwiebel (1996a) does not imply a profile of wages and profits that coincides with the Shapley values as claimed in...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013016648

Selecting the Best? Spillover and Shadows in Elimination Tournaments

Brown, Jennifer - 2015

our theory predictions using data from high-stakes tournaments. Empirical results suggest that shadow and spillover …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013037448