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procedures. A noisy signal, however, means that the optimal contract will involve terms that courts might view as punitive and so …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012763577
rate and time taken in a procurement setting, characterizing the efficient contract design. Using new micro-level data on …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013117563
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013236722
Tournaments, reward structures based on rank order, are compared with individual contracts in a model with one risk-neutral principal and many risk-averse agents. Each agents' output is a stochastic function of his effort level plus an additive shock term that is common to all the agents. The...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013232756
In this paper I explore optimal employment contract design in a random search framework, where workers search on and … unobserved by the firm and cannot be directly contracted upon. Firms differ in productivity by which they employ workers. Firms …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013056592
This article studies traditional and modern theories of executive compensation, bringing them together under a unifying framework. We analyze assignment models of the level of pay, and static and dynamic moral hazard models of incentives, and compare their predictions to empirical findings. We...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013023343
Two parties sign a contract but before they fully perform they modify the contract. Should courts enforce the modified … to write a contract that is robust to hold-up or that makes the facts relevant to modification verifiable. But … contract technology, e.g., the use of liquidated damages, to ensure commitment are disfavored by courts and subject to …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012870721
This paper considers functions of contracting other than the protection of relationship-specific investments and the provision of marginal incentives, and applies the theory to explain variation in the form of compensation of over-the-road truck drivers in the U.S. Specifically, we argue that...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013212570
This paper shows that the informativeness principle, as originally formulated by Holmstrom (1979), does not hold if the first-order approach is invalid. We introduce a "generalized informativeness principle" that takes into account non-local incentive constraints and holds generically, even...
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013040535
This paper identifies a class of multiperiod agency problems in which the optimal contract is tractable (attainable in … closed form). By modeling the noise before the action in each period, we force the contract to provide sufficient incentives … utility, a pecuniary cost of effort, Gaussian noise or continuous time. The contract's functional form is independent of the …
Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013150112