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Coalition Formation in Legislative Bargaining

Battaglini, Marco - 2019

the policies they can pursue are constrained by the identity of the coalition members. In the model, a formateur picks a … coalition and negotiates for the allocation of the surplus it is expected to generate. The formateur is free to change … generalized version of a Nash Bargaining Solution in which —in contrast to the standard solution— the coalition is endogenous and …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012890469

Naked Exclusion : An Experimental Study of Contracts with Externalities

Landeo, Claudia - 2010

This paper reports the results of an experiment designed to assess the ability of an incumbent seller to profitably foreclose a market with exclusive contracts. We use the strategic environment described by Rasmusen, Ramseyer, and Wiley (1991) and Segal and Whinston (2000) where entry is...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012759185

Quantitative Models of Commercial Policy

Ossa, Ralph - 2016

What tariffs would countries impose if they did not have to fear any retaliation? What would occur if there was a complete breakdown of trade policy cooperation? What would be the outcome if countries engaged in fully efficient trade negotiations? And what would happen to trade policy...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012997374

Collective Action in an Asymmetric World

Chen, Cuicui - 2016

A central authority possessing tax and expenditure responsibilities can readily provide an efficient level of a public good. Absent a central authority, voluntary arrangements must replace coercive ones. Significant under-provision must be expected. International public goods are particularly...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012992148

Persuading with Anecdotes

Haghtalab, Nika; Immorlica, Nicole; Lucier, Brendan; … - 2022

We study a model of social learning and communication using hard anecdotal evidence. There are two Bayesian agents (a sender and a receiver) who wish to communicate. The receiver must take an action whose payoff depends on their personal preferences and an unknown state of the world. The sender...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10014243362

“Nash-in-Nash” Bargaining : A Microfoundation for Applied Work

Collard-Wexler, Allan - 2014

A “Nash equilibrium in Nash bargains” has become a workhorse bargaining model in applied analyses of bilateral oligopoly. This paper proposes a non-cooperative foundation for “Nash-in-Nash” bargaining that extends the Rubinstein (1982) alternating offers model to multiple upstream and...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013044612

Coasean Bargaining to Address Environmental Externalities

Libecap, Gary D. - 2016

I examine Ronald Coase's criticism of standard regulatory and tax policies to address environmental externalities. I …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013000533

Voluntary Public Goods Provision, Coalition Formation, and Uncertainty

Burger, Nick - 2009

coalitions to provide public goods. Theory is ambiguous on the equilibrium coalition size and contribution rates. We examine the … emergence of coalitions, their size, and how uncertainty in public goods provision affects contribution levels and coalition … coalition to provide the good. Contrary a core theoretical result, we find that coalition size increases when the public good …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013153581

Coalition Formation in Political Games

Acemoglu, Daron - 2006

We study the formation of a ruling coalition in political environments. Each individual is endowed with a level of … political power. The ruling coalition consists of a subset of the individuals in the society and decides the distribution of … resources. A ruling coalition needs to contain enough powerful members to win against any alternative coalition that may …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012778980

Organizational Equilibrium with Capital

Bassetto, Marco - 2018

This paper proposes a new equilibrium concept – organizational equilibrium – for models with state variables that have a time-inconsistency problem. The key elements of this equilibrium concept are: (1) agents are allowed to ignore the history and restart the equilibrium; (2) agents can wait...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012906321