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Byford, Martin C. - 2014

from, individual markets. We show that this gives rise to a new mechanism by which a cartel can sustain a collusive …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013053469

The Scope for Collusive Behavior Among Debtor Countries

Fernández, Raquel; Glazer, Jacob - 2021

We study the question of whether there exist strategies whereby countries are able to sustain a cartel or collusive … scale in bargaining--if commitment were possible the countries would benefit from joint bargaining--a debtors' cartel will …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013246071

Strategic Use of Antidumping Law to Enforce Tacit International Collusion

Staiger, Robert W.; Wolak, Frank A. - 2021

We consider the impact of domestic antidumping law in a two-country partial equilibrium model where domestic and foreign firms tacitly collude in the domestic market. Firms engage in an infinitely repeated game, with each period composed of a two-stage game. In the first stage each firm chooses...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013210568

Competition and the Ratchet Effect

Charness, Gary - 2010

In labor markets, the ratchet effect refers to a situation where workers subject to performance pay choose to restrict their output, because they rationally anticipate that firms will respond to higher output levels by raising output requirements or cutting pay. We model this effect as a...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013138400

Channeling Domestic Savings into Productive Investment Under Asymmetric Information : The Essential Role of Foreign Direct Investment

Razin, Asaf - 2014

Foreign direct investment (FDI) is observed to be a predominant form of capital flows to low and middle income countries with insufficiently developed capital markets. This paper analyzes the problem of channeling domestic savings into productive investment in the presence of asymmetric...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012752887

Social Insurance, Information Revelation, and Lack of Commitment

Golosov, Mikhail - 2014

We study the optimal provision of insurance against unobservable idiosyncratic shocks in a setting in which a benevolent government cannot commit. A continuum of agents and the government play an infinitely repeated game. Actions of the government are constrained only by the threat of reverting...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013044626

Entry and Predation : British Shipping Cartels 1879-1929

Scott Morton, Fiona - 2021

century. These established markets are completely dominated by an incumbent cartel composed of several member shipping lines …. The cartel makes the decision whether or not to begin a price war against the entrant; some entrants are formally admitted … to the cartel without any conflict. I use characteristics of the entrant to predict whether or not the entrant will …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013222218

Vertical Restraints in the Bromine Cartel : The Role of Distributors in Facilitating Collusion

Levenstein, Margaret - 2010

From 1885 to 1902 manufacturers and distributors in the American bromine industry cooperated to increase prices and profits. Like many sectors of the American economy at the time, the bromine industry was made up a large number of small manufacturers and a small number of national distributors....

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012760014

Marketing Agencies and Collusive Bidding in Online Ad Auctions

Decarolis, Francesco - 2017

The transition of the advertising market from traditional media to the internet has induced a proliferation of marketing agencies specialized in bidding in the auctions that are used to sell ad space on the web. We analyze how collusive bidding can emerge from bid delegation to a common...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012944647

Adverse Selection in Competitive Search Equilibrium

Guerrieri, Veronica; Shimer, Robert; Wright, Randall D. - 2021

We extend the concept of competitive search equilibrium to environments with private information, and in particular adverse selection. Principals (e.g. employers or agents who want to buy assets) post contracts, which we model as revelation mechanisms. Agents (e.g. workers, or asset holders)...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013235346