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Jiang, Liangliang - 2014

Did regulatory reforms that lowered barriers to competition among U.S. banks increase or decrease the quality of information that banks disclose to the public and regulators? We find that an intensification of competition reduced abnormal accruals of loan loss provisions and the frequency with...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013039766

Signaling and Accounting Information

Myers, Stewart C. - 2006

This paper develops a signaling model in which accounting information improves real investment decisions. Pure cash … flow reporting is shown to lead to underinvestment when managers have superior information but are acting in shareholders …' interests. Accounting by prespecified, quot;objectivequot; rules alleviates the underinvestment problem …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012783961

The Limitations of Stock Market Efficiency : Price Informativeness and CEO Turnover

Gorton, Gary - 2009

Stock prices are more informative when the information has less social value. Speculators with limited resources making costly (private) information production decisions must decide to produce information about some firms and not others. We show that producing and trading on private information...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013159958

Tips and Tells from Managers : How Analysts and the Market Read between the Lines of Conference Calls

Druz, Marina - 2015

Stock prices react significantly to the tone (negativity of words) managers use on earnings conference calls. This …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013027252

Smokescreen : How Managers Behave When They Have Something to Hide

Artiga González, Tanja - 2013

unusually low CEO turnover and rely on internal management promotions. Their managers exercise stock options faster than … managers of other firms. Cartel firms are large donors to political candidates. While our results are based only upon firms … engaged in price fixing, we expect that they should apply generally to all companies in which managers seek to conceal poor …

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013085128

Executives' "Off-the-Job" Behavior, Corporate Culture, and Financial Reporting Risk

Davidson, Robert H. - 2012

We examine how executives' behavior outside the workplace, as measured by their ownership of luxury goods (low "frugality") and prior legal infractions, is related to financial reporting risk. We predict and find that CEOs and CFOs with a legal record are more likely to perpetrate fraud. In...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013107519

Strategic News Releases in Equity Vesting Months

Edmans, Alex - 2014

We show that CEOs strategically time corporate news releases to coincide with months in which their equity vests. These vesting months are determined by equity grants made several years prior, and thus unlikely driven by the current information environment. CEOs reallocate news into vesting...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013047405

Transparency and Negotiated Prices : The Value of Information in Hospital-Supplier Bargaining

Grennan, Matthew - 2016

Using a detailed dataset of hospitals' purchase orders, we find that information on purchasing by peer hospitals leads to reductions in the prices hospitals negotiate for supplies. Identification is based on staggered access to information across hospitals over time. Within coronary stents,...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012997889

Search Engines and Data Retention : Implications for Privacy and Antitrust

Chiou, Lesley - 2017

This paper investigates whether larger quantities of historical data affect a firm's ability to maintain market share in Internet search. We study whether the length of time that search engines retained their server logs affected the apparent accuracy of subsequent searches. Our analysis...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10012947653

The Generalized Informativeness Principle

Chaigneau, Pierre - 2014

This paper shows that the informativeness principle, as originally formulated by Holmstrom (1979), does not hold if the first-order approach is invalid. We introduce a "generalized informativeness principle" that takes into account non-local incentive constraints and holds generically, even...

Persistent link: https://www.econbiz.de/10013040535